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Abstract
Incorporating the homogeneous good sector into the Melitz model, we re-consider the
findings in Demidova (2008, International Economic Review) that two countries have dif-
ferent productivity distribution functions. Although the asymmetry of the productivity
distribution function causes highly non-linear equations and incorporating the homoge-
neous good sector yields the difference in markup rates between sectors, we graphically
conclude that there are no multiple equilibria and no pure exporters, and that the ef-
fects of trade liberalization on welfare are not qualitatively different from those in the
one-sector Melitz model. Finally, supposing that trade specialization arises in the differ-
entiated good sector, we confirm the welfare impacts of trade liberalization.
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1 Introduction
In an economy that consists solely of the homogeneous good (numeraire) sector, the compet-
itive market with free entry forces inefficient firms out of the market and secures the position
of efficient firms; however, incorporating a differentiated good sector does not maintain the
abovementioned efficiency but creates a distortion caused by the differences in the markups
charged by firms in two sectors; namely, a zero markup in the numeraire sector and a pos-
itive constant markup in the differentiated good sector. The difference between single- and
multiple-sector models matters and must be treated carefully. In this paper, incorporating
the homogenous good sector into the one-sector Melitz model, we re-consider the findings in
Demidova (2008).
In addition to different markup rates between two sectors, Demidova (2008) supposes
that two countries have different productivity distribution functions, thereby showing that
the shape heterogeneity in the productivity distribution functions creates a highly non-linear
model structure.1 As a result, one may expect a deviation of the findings obtained by the
one-sector Melitz model: no multiple equilibria, no pure exporters, and the positive impacts
of trade liberalization on welfare. Demidova (2008) also mentions that falling trade cost may
lead to welfare loss in a country (See Proposition 1), and the appearance of pure exporters.
However, the use of the general form of the productivity distribution function in Demidova
(2008) may not lead to a fruitful finding in the analytic analysis. Specifically, Demidova
(2008) provides Assumption 1 to ensure that, in both countries, only firms producing in the
domestic market can export, assuming that fx/f > X, where X depends on the difference
in productivity distributions, which characterizes the productivity cutoff levels (See Lemma 3
in Demidova (2008)) and trade structure (See Lemma 4 in Demidova (2008)). However, we
cannot see what X is in a concrete expression.
Following a large part of the literature such as Helpman et al. (2004), we assume a
Pareto productivity distribution throughout. This assumption allows us to characterize our
results in closed form despite country asymmetries by deriving a graphically novel analysis,
and thus to inspect the underlying mechanism in the most transparent way. Solving our
1This asymmetry of productivity distribution is empirically supported in Balistreri et al. (2011), Hshieh
and Ossa (2015), and Spearot (2016).
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model analytically, we conclude that as long as two-way trade arises, there are no multiple
equilibria and no pure exporter, and that the welfare impacts are qualitatively the same as
in the one-sector Melitz model.
While the abovementioned findings are related to a re-consideration of Demidova’s (2008)
set-up, we also make an original analysis considering that trade specialization arises in the
differentiated good sector. We then find that under this specialization, unilateral trade liber-
alization contributes welfare gain to the importing country, which is completely the opposite
of the welfare impact of trade liberalization under two-way trade. The reason for this is
that the trade liberalization that occurs under the specialization does not induce the entry of
less productive firms, thereby implying that there is no resource allocation that deteriorates
welfare in the importing country. As a result, the trade liberalization decreases the price of
differentiated goods and hence yields the welfare gain in the importing country.
Our analysis is related to the important strands of literature regarding the asymmetric
shape parameters of the Pareto distribution that governs productivity draws by country.
Shape heterogeneity complicates the system of equilibrium equations so that little is known
about the welfare effects of trade policy in such a setting except for Demidova (2008), Demi-
dova and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013), and Spearot (2016). When Demidova and Rodr´ıguez-Clare
(2013) built a small economy model of Melitz (2003), they showed that a decline in import
costs always benefits the liberalizing country. Alternatively, we make use of an asymmetric
two-country Melitz model, and then confirm the welfare effects of trade liberalization (i.e., a
decrease in the iceberg cost). Spearot (2016) employs an amended version of Melitz and Ot-
taviano (2008) by removing the outside good, and allows for shape heterogeneity. He drives
for the welfare effects of trade shocks theoretically, while his interest is in empirical analysis
of the welfare effects of tariff shocks.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our model. Section 3 derives and
discusses the free entry conditions. Section 4 analyzes the reversal of productivity cutoffs and
the (non)existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Section 5 examines the welfare effects of
trade liberalization. Section 6 considers the case that trade in the differentiated good sector
is specialized. Concluding remarks appear in Section 7.
3
2 Model
Except for the specification in Pareto productivity distribution, our model remains faithfully
the same as that in Demidova (2008). Consider the world economy consisting of home and
foreign countries (indexed by i = H,F ) with two sectors: the homogenous and differentiated
good sectors. As in Demidova (2008), we assume that the homogeneous good is produced
under constant returns to scale, and that it is produced in each country and freely traded
under incomplete specialization. As a result, we can choose the homonogeous good for our
nume´raire. This assumption also ensures factor price equalization across countries, and the
prices and wages in both countries are then normalized, where labor is the sole factor of
production in inelastic supply L and is immobile across countries.
2.1 Demand
The preference of a representative consumer in a country i is a Cobb-Douglas utility function
over a continuum of goods indexed by ω and a homogeneous good N (our nume´raire):
U i = (Ci)β(N i)1−β , 0 < β < 1, i = H,F. (1)
where Ci is a consumption index over consumption of individual-domestic varieties qid(ω) and
-imported varieties qim(ω): C
i ≡
(∫
ω∈Ωi q
i
d(ω)
σ−1
σ dω +
∫
ω∈Ωi q
i
m(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
) σ
σ−1
(i = H,F ). Ωi
is the set of available varieties in a country i, and σ(> 1) is a constant elasticity of substitution
between any two goods. The price index dual to Ci is P i =
(∫
ω∈Ωi pd(ω)
1−σdω +
∫
ω∈Ωi px(ω)
1−σdω
) 1
1−σ ,
where pd(ω) and px(ω) are the prices of domestic and exporting variety ω. As confirmed later,
the price is symmetric between countries and thus, we omit the notation that specifies a
country. We can then derive the optimal consumption for individual-domestic and -imported
varieties ω: qid(ω) = C
i
(
pd(ω)
P i
)
−σ
and qim(ω) = C
i
(
px(ω)
P j
)
−σ
(i, j = H,F, i ̸= j).
2.2 Production in the differentiated-good sector
Denoting the iceberg cost by τ and the fixed production costs for the domestic and export
goods by f and fx, we can represent firm technology by cost functions l
i
d(ϕ) = (f + q
i
d/ϕ)
and lix(ϕ) = (fx+ τq
j
m/ϕ), where we assume that trade is costly such that fx > f and τ > 1.
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From the profit maximization in monopolistic competition, we obtain the pricing rules:
px(ϕ) = τpd(ϕ), pd(ϕ) =
(
σ
σ − 1
)(
1
ϕ
)
, (2a)
where px(ϕ) and pd(ϕ) are symmetric between two countries. Defining r
i
d(ϕ) = pd(ϕ)q
i
d(ϕ)
and rix(ϕ) = px(ϕ)q
j
m(ϕ) (i = H,F , i ̸= j) as the revenue earned by a country i’s firm in
domestic and foreign markets, we obtain:
rid(ϕ) = R
i
(
pd(ϕ)
P i
)1−σ
, rix(ϕ) = R
i
(
px(ϕ)
P j
)1−σ
, i, j = H,F, i ̸= j. (2b)
where Ri denotes aggregate revenue earned by country i’s firms in the differentiated good
sector. In what follows, we denote the profit functions of a country i’s firm in domestic and
export markets by piid(ϕ) and pi
i
x(ϕ) (i = H,F ), and therefore the total profit can be written
as pii(ϕ) = max{0, piid(ϕ)} +max{0, pi
i
x(ϕ)}. We can then show the zero-profit conditions as
follows:2
piid(ϕ
i∗) =
rid(ϕ
i∗
d )
σ
− f = 0, piix(ϕ
i∗) =
rix(ϕ
i∗
x )
σ
− fx = 0, i = H,F. (2c)
where ϕi∗d and ϕ
i∗
x show the productivity cutoff levels for serving the domestic and export
markets. Using these expressions, we can show that the productivity cutoff levels for the
domestic market (ϕi∗d ) and export market (ϕ
i∗
x ) are linked as follows:
3
ϕF∗x = Aϕ
H∗
d , ϕ
H∗
x = Aϕ
F∗
d , A ≡ τ
(
fx
f
) 1
σ−1
(> 1). (3)
3 Industry equilibrium
The concrete entry-exit process follows the setting in Demidova (2008). There is a large
pool of prospective entrants, M ie, into an industry in a country i, and firms are ex-ante
identical. To enter, they must make an irreversible investment, modeled as a fixed entry cost
fe (measured in units of labor). In what follows, once the sunk entry cost is paid, firms draw
2Please observe that the revenue of a country i’s firm in the export market is shown by rix(ϕ) = px(ϕ)q
j
m(ϕ),
which is the same as rj(τ−1ϕ) = p(τ−1ϕ)qj(ϕ)(notation adapted) in Demidova (2008).
3From (2c), we obtain rHd (ϕ
H∗
d ) = r
F
d (ϕ
F∗
d ) and r
H
x (ϕ
H∗
x ) = r
F
x (ϕ
F∗
x ). Substituting (2a) and (2b) into these
equations yields
ϕH∗d
ϕF∗
d
= P
F
PH
and
ϕH∗x
ϕF∗x
= P
H
PF
. Next, (2c) leads to
rix(ϕ
i∗
x )
ri
d
(ϕi∗
d
)
= fx
f
. Using this equation, from (2b)
we can show that
ϕH∗x
ϕH∗
d
= AP
H
PF
and
ϕF∗x
ϕF∗
d
= A P
F
PH
. Finally, using these equations and canceling out the relative
price index P
H
PF
, we have (3).
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their productivity ϕ from a common distribution gi(ϕ) that has a continuous cumulative
distribution Gi(ϕ), where we specify the function as follows:
Gi(ϕ) = 1−
(
ϕˆi
ϕ
)ki
, i = H,F, (4)
where ϕˆi > 0 is the lower bound of the support of the productivity distribution. The shape
parameter ki indexes dispersion; lower values of ki are associated with greater productivity
dispersion. For average firm size to be finite, we require ki > σ − 1(> 0), where σ > 1 is
easily confirmed in (2a).4 Therefore, the following inequality is always held:
Ak
i
f
fx
= τk
i
(
fx
f
) ki−(σ−1)
σ−1
(> 1). (5)
After the entry, they face a constant exogenous probability of death δ. Therefore, in the
stationary equilibrium, the mass of active firms that are alive in a country i, M i is defined
by piinM
i
e = δM
i. We define the probability of successful entry by piin = min{D
i, X i}, where
Di ≡ (1−Gi(ϕi∗d )) and X
i ≡ (1−Gi(ϕi∗x )) are the respective probabilities of successful entry
into the domestic and export markets.
Unlike our paper, Demidova (2008) assumes a more general productivity distribution and
provides the following assumption:
gH(ϕ)
1−GH(ϕ)
<
gF (ϕ)
1−GF (ϕ)
. (6)
According to Demidova (2008, p.1446), (6) means that (notation adapted)for any given level
ϕ, entrants in the Home with the productivity distribution GH(·) have a better chance of
obtaining a productivity draw than entrants in the Foreign with the productivity distribution
GF (·). Moreover, assuming that fx/f > X but X is unclear, where she only mentions that
X depends on the difference in productivity distributions (see Assumption 1 in Demidova
(2008)), she finds an interesting order of productivity cutoffs: ϕF∗d < ϕ
H∗
d < ϕ
H∗
x < ϕ
F∗
x .
With Pareto distributed productivity (4), the assumption (6) becomes kH < kF (observe
that the asymmetric lower bound ϕˆi is irrelevant here). Below, we will demonstrate that even
if (6) is not satisfied (that is, kH = kF ), the results of Demidova (2008) can still be obtained.
4This inequality is necessary given that the support for the Pareto distribution is unbounded from above
and given the assumption of a continuum of firms: see Helpman et al. (2004), Redding (2011), and Melitz
and Redding (2014) for details.
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3.1 Free entry condition (FEC)
In an equilibrium with positive firm entry, we require that FEC holds; the expected value of
a firm with productivity ϕ, vi(ϕ) = max{0, p¯ii(ϕ)/δ}, equals the sunk entry cost f ie, where
the variable p¯ii is expected profits conditional on successful entry:5
p¯ii
δ
=
Dipiid(ϕ˜
i
d(ϕ
i∗
d )) +X
ipiix(ϕ˜
i
x(ϕ
i∗
x ))
δ
=
Di
[(
ϕ˜id(ϕ
i∗
d )
ϕi∗d
)σ−1
− 1
]
f +X i
[(
ϕ˜ix(ϕ
i∗
x )
ϕi∗x
)σ−1
− 1
]
fx
δ
= fe,
(7)
Here, the weighted average productivities in the domestic and export markets are defined
as: ϕ˜id(ϕ
i∗
d ) ≡
[
1
1−Gi(ϕi∗d )
∫
∞
ϕi∗d
ϕσ−1gi(ϕ)dϕ
]1/(σ−1)
=
(
ki
1+ki−σ
)1/(σ−1)
ϕi∗d and ϕ˜
i
x(ϕ
i∗
x ) ≡[
1
1−Gi(ϕi∗x )
∫
∞
ϕi∗x
ϕσ−1gi(ϕ)dϕ
]1/(σ−1)
=
(
ki
1+ki−σ
)1/(σ−1)
ϕi∗x .
Substituting (4) into (7) and eliminating the export productivity cutoff level ϕi∗x by (3),
we can derive FECs in each country:
(
f(ϕi∗d )
−ki + fx(Aϕ
j∗
d )
−ki
)
= ∆i, i, j = H,F, i ̸= j. (8)
Notice that the right-hand side of (8) has a positive sign and consists of constant parameters
alone ∆i ≡ δfe(k
i
−σ+1)
(σ−1)(ϕˆi)k
i (> 0).
It would be difficult to investigate the productivity cutoff levels that satisfy two FECs in
(8) under two-way trade because of the highly nonlinear system in (8). Therefore, we try to
characterize the productivity cutoff levels graphically. To do so, in our paper, FECs in home
country (FEC-H) and foreign country (FEC-F), (8) are now rewritten as:
FEC-H: y =
∆HAk
H
fx
−
fAk
H
fx
z, FEC-F: y = f−k
H/kF
(
∆F − fxA
−kF zk
F /kH
)kH/kF
, (9)
where we define z ≡
(
ϕH∗d
)
−kH
(> 0) and y ≡
(
ϕF∗d
)
−kH
(> 0). To depict FECs in (z, y)
graph, we now confirm each slope of FEC-H and FEC-F, where we use (5):
∂y
∂z
∣∣∣∣
FEC-H
= −
Ak
H
f
fx
(< −1),
∂y
∂z
∣∣∣∣
FEC-F
= −
A−k
F
fx
f
(
z
y
) kF
kH
−1
(< 0). (10)
5To derive (7), we first explain that piid(ϕ˜
i
d) = (
(
ϕ˜id/ϕ
i∗
)σ−1
− 1)f . From (2a), (2b)and (2c), we can
derive (ϕi∗d )
σ−1/f = ((σ − 1)/Ri) (σ/(σ − 1))σ (P i)1−σ. Next, the profit of a firm with the weighted average
productivity is piid(ϕ˜
i
d) = p(ϕ˜
i
d)q(ϕ˜
i
d)− (f + q(ϕ˜
i
d)/ϕ˜
i
d), which can be rewritten as pi
i
d(ϕ˜
i
d) = (R
i/(σ− 1))((σ−
1)/σ)σ(1/P i)1−σ(1/ϕ˜id)
1−σ − f . Substituting the former equation into piid(ϕ˜
i
d), we obtain the expression for
piid(ϕ˜
i
d) = (
(
ϕ˜id/ϕ
i∗
d
)σ−1
− 1)f . By the same token, we can derive piix(ϕ˜
i
x) = (
(
ϕ˜ix/ϕ
i∗
x
)σ−1
− 1)fx.
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Figures 1(a) and 1(b) represent two FECs and the 45 degree line in (z,y) graph. Hereafter,
FEC-H is depicted by a solid line with the negative slope as in Figure 1(a). On the contrary,
FEC-F is expressed by a chain line (kH = kF ) or a chain curve (kH ̸= kF ) as in Figure 1(b),
which can be summarized in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 When kH = kF , FEC-F is a straight line. When kH > kF , FEC-F is convex to
the origin, while when kH < kF , FEC-F is concave to the origin.
Proof. The second derivatives of FEC-F in (9) are given by:
∂2y
∂z2
∣∣∣∣
FEC-F
=
fxA
−kF∆F
f
z
kF
kH
−2
(
∆F − fxA
−kF z
kF
kH
) kH
kF
−2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
(
kH − kF
kH
)
.
This establishes Lemma 1.
We now mention two points that are important to characterize the existence and order of
the productivity cutoff levels in the graphical analysis. First, we identify the coordinates on
the z- and y-intercepts of FEC-H and FEC-F in Figures 1(a) and 1(b). Let zH and zF denote
the z-coordinates on the z-intercept of FEC-H and FEC-F, and yH and yF the y-coordinates
on the y-intercept of those as in Figures 1(a) and 1(b). After some algebra, we get:
zH =
∆H
f
, zF = A
kH
(
∆F
fx
)kH/kF
, yH =
∆HAk
H
fx
, yF =
(
∆F
f
)kH/kF
. (11)
Second, Figure 1(a) (Figure 1(b)) shows the point H45 (F 45), which is the intersection
between FEC-H (FEC-F) and the 45-degree line. Hereafter, as in Figures 1(a) and 1(b), the
intersection between FEC-H and a line is shown by a round point, while that between FEC-F
and a line is shown by a square point. The z-coordinates of the points H45 and F 45 are:
H45 : zH45 =
∆H
f + fxA−k
H , F
45 : zF 45 =
(
∆F
f + fxA−k
F
)kH/kF
. (12)
We must observe that Figure 1(b) omits the points F 45 and the corresponding z-coordinates
zF 45 under k
H > kF and kH < kF , in order to avoid confusion due to too many points.
3.2 Aggregate expenditures, revenue, and the trade balance condition
In this subsection, we consider the trade balance conditions that guarantee two-way trade.
First, we show the country-symmetry of the aggregate expenditures. Following the description
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in (1), we suppose that the superscript N shows the homogeneous good sector. Assuming
that the country size L is fixed and symmetric between two countries, from (1) we can show
that the aggregate expenditures on the homogenous good (EN ) and differentiated good (E)
are symmetric between two countries: EN = N i = (1− β)L and E = CiP i = βL (i = H,F ).
Second, we consider the aggregate revenue earned by domestic firms in the differentiated
good sector, defined by Ri = γiL, where γi is the fraction of labor employed in the differenti-
ated good sector in a country i. Unlike closed economy, it does not always hold that Ri = E
in each country i under open economy. On the contrary, since the world expenditure on the
differentiated goods equals the world revenues, it holds that RH + RF = 2E, which can be
rewritten as:
γH + γF = 2β. (13)
Since both countries have labor employed in the differentiated good sector under the two-
way trade, the inequality 0 < γi < min{1, 2β} must be satisfied from (13) and 0 < γi < 1
(i = H, F ).
Next, we show the trade balance condition:6
MHx r
H
x (ϕ˜
H
x (ϕ
H∗
d )) + (1− γ
H)L− (1− β)L =MFx r
F
x (ϕ˜
F
x (ϕ
F∗
d )), (14a)
where M ix is the mass of exporting firms in a country i. Denoting b
i ≡
Dirid(ϕ˜
i
d(ϕ
i∗
d ))
Xirix(ϕ˜
i
x(ϕ
i∗
x ))
, we can
show that the fraction γH is:7
γH =
(
1 +
bF − bH
bF bH − 1
)
β, (14b)
and (13) pins down the fraction γF .
To characterize the labor markets, from (14b) we depict three conditions by the bF = 1,
bH = 1 and bF = bH lines in (z, y) graph as in Figures 2(a) and 2(b). What is important is
that only when bH > 1 and bF > 1, does two-way trade arise (See Appendix B). Then, each
line is given by:
bH = 1 : y =
Ak
H
f
fx
z, bF = 1 : y = A−k
H
(
fx
f
)kH/kF
z. (15)
We can summarize the results as follows:
6The equation (14a) is the same as (A.14) in Demidova (2008) (notation adapted).
7See Appendix A.
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Lemma 2 The equilibrium with two-way trade has bH > 1 and bF > 1, which corresponds
to the following inequalities:
A−k
H
(
fx
f
)kH/kF
z < y <
Ak
H
f
fx
z, (16)
Proof. From Appendix B, we can show that bH = τσ−1Ak
H+1−σ
(
ϕF∗d
ϕH∗d
)kH
and bF =
τσ−1Ak
F+1−σ
(
ϕH∗d
ϕF∗d
)kF
. It can easily be seen that bH > 1 and bF > 1 correspond to (16).
Figure 2(a) denotes the intersection between FEC-H and bH = 1 line by the round point
HbH and between FEC-H and bF = 1 by HbF . Moreover, in Figure 2(b), the square point
F bH (F bF ) is the intersection between FEC-F and bH = 1 (bF = 1).8 The z-intercepts at the
four points (HbH , HbF , F bH , and F bF ) in Figures 2(a) and 2(b) are given by:
zHbH =
∆H
2f
, zF bH =
(
∆F
f
)kH/kF
Υ, zHbF =
∆HAk
H
fxΛ
, zF bF = A
kH
(
∆F
2fx
)kH/kF
. (17)
where Υ ≡
(
Ak
F
f
fx
(fx/f)
1−kF /kH + fx
Ak
F
f
)
−kH/kF
and Λ ≡ fA
kH
fx
+ fx
Ak
H
f
(fx/f)
kH/kF−1.
Turning back to (14b), we can see that γH > β > γF under bF > bH and γF > β > γH
under bF < bH . Therefore, we depict the condition in which bF ≶ bF by the bF = bH line as
in Figures 2(a) and 2(b), which can be written as:9
bH = bF line : y = A
(kH−kF )kH
kH+kF z, (18)
If bF > bH , corresponding to γH > β > γF , then it holds that y > A
(kH−kF )kH
kH+kF z. On the
contrary, when bF < bH , we can show that γF > β > γH .
Comparing the slopes of the four lines (bH = bF , bF = 1, bH = 1, and the 45 degree lines),
we obtain the following results.
Lemma 3 We can show that the bH = bF line is always in the upper of bF = 1 and is in the
lower of bH = 1. Next, when kH = kF , the bH = bF line corresponds to the 45 degree line.
If kH > kF , then the bH = bF line lies in the upper of the 45 degree line. On the contrary, if
kH < kF , the bH = bF line lies in the lower of the 45 degree line.
8We omit FEC-F under kF ̸= kH in order not to confuse the readers with too many lines.
9Concretely, bF − bH = f
fx
(
Ak
H
(
ϕH∗d
ϕF∗
d
)kF
− Ak
F ( ϕF∗d
ϕH∗
d
)kH )
= A
kH fz
fxy
{
Ak
F
−kH
(
z
y
)
−
kF
kH
−1
− 1
}
. Based on
the curly bracket in this equation, we obtain (18).
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Proof. Comparing (15) with (18), we can show that:10 A
kH f
fx
> A
(kH−kF )kH
kH+kF > A−k
H
(
fx
f
) kH
kF ,
which means that the positive slope of bH = bF line is greater than that of bF = 1, while
it is lower than that of the bH = 1 line. As a result, bH = bF line lies in the upper of the
bF = 1 line and the lower of the bH = 1 line. Next, when kH = kF , bH = bF line in (18) can
be reduced to the 45 degree line y = z. When kH > kF , the positive slope of the bH = bF
line is greater than the unity, which implies that the bH = bF line is in the upper of the 45
degree line. When kH < kF , the reverse can be applied. That is, the bH = bF line is in the
lower of the 45 degree line under kH < kF .
From Lemma 2 and 3, we can conclude the following.
Lemma 4 When the intersection between FEC-F and FEC-H lies in the upper of the bF = bH
line and the lower of the bH = 1 line, it holds that bF > bH > 1 so that (min{2β, 1} >)γH >
β > γF (> 0). In contrast, when it lies in the lower of the bF = bH line and the upper of the
bF = 1 line, it holds that bH > bF > 1 so that (min{2β, 1} >)γF > β > γH(> 0).
Proof. Using Lemma 2 and 3, from Figure 2(a) and 2(b) we obtain this result.
Finally, Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show four areas (A1)–(A4) in (z, y) graph that are separated
by the bH = 1, bH = bF , and bF = 1 lines. In areas (A2) and (A3), two-way trade arises.
Specifically, as in Lemma 4, we see that (min{2β, 1} >)γH > β > γF (> 0) in area (A2), and
that (min{2β, 1} >)γF > β > γH(> 0) in area (A3). On the contrary, in areas (A1) and
(A4), two-way trade cannot be seen.11
10More concretely, making use of (5), we can show that:
Ak
H
f
fx
> A
(kH−kF )kH
kH+kF , ⇒ 1 > τ
−
2kHkF
kH+kF
(
fx
f
)−kH (kF+1−σ)−kF (kH+1−σ)
(σ−1)(kH+kF )
,
A
(kH−kF )kH
kH+kF > A−k
H
(
fx
f
) kH
kF
,⇒ τ
2kH
kH+kF
(
fx
f
) kH (kF+1−σ)+kF (kH+1−σ)
kF (σ−1)(kH+kF )
> 1,
where we note that τ > 1, fx > f and k
i > σ − 1(> 0).
11We mention the trade specialization later.
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4 Productivity cutoff levels
The purpose of this section is to determine graphically the productivity cutoff levels that
satisfy FECs under two-way trade.12 First, we can show the following:
Lemma 5 In equilibrium with two-way trade, it always holds that ϕi∗d < ϕ
i∗
x (i = H,F ).
Proof. Making use of Lemma 2, we can obtain the result. This is because ϕH∗d ≥ ϕ
H∗
x and
ϕF∗d ≥ ϕ
F∗
x lead to y ≥ A
kHz and y ≤ A−k
H
z respectively.13 Then, the areas that satisfy
y ≥ Ak
H
z and y ≤ A−k
H
z are outside of the areas given (16).
Lemma (5) concludes that as long as two-way trade arises, there are no pure exporters
that only export but do not produce for the domestic market. This finding is different from
Demidova (2008) that shows that pure exporters may exist. In addition, using the Pareto
productivity distribution function, we do not need to provide the extra assumption that
Demidova (2008) provides in Assumption 1: To ensure that in both countries only firms
producing in the domestic market can export, assuming that fx/f > X, where X depends on
the difference in productivity distributions. As mentioned in the Introduction, we cannot see
what X is in a concrete expression.
4.1 Asymmetric lower bound of the support of the productivity distribu-
tion
We now assume k ≡ kH = kF but ϕˆH ̸= ϕˆF so that ∆H ̸= ∆F . The case of ∆H < ∆F
is shown in Figure 3(a), and ∆H > ∆F in Figure 3(b). From Lemma 1, FEC-F graph is
given by a straight line when kH = kF . There are then two important points that we should
mention. First, this case does not satisfy HRSD of Demidova (2008) (See (6) in our paper);
however, we emphasize that her findings can be obtained here. Second, although our focus
is on the asymmetry of the productivity distributions, ∆i includes fe and δ. In sum, the
12In a symmetric Melitz model (k ≡ kH = kF and ∆ ≡ ∆H = ∆F ), from (9), we can analytically obtain
ϕi∗d =
(
f
∆
fAk
fx
−
fx
fAk
fAk
fx
−1
)1/k
(> 0), ϕi∗x = A
kϕi∗d , (i = H,F ) where ϕ
i∗
d has a positive sign due to (5). As A > 1,
we find the symmetric Melitz (2003) result: ϕH∗d = ϕ
F∗
d < ϕ
H∗
x = ϕ
F∗
x .
13For instance, taking account of ϕH∗d ≥ ϕ
H∗
x , we make use of (3), leading to ϕ
H∗
d ≥ Aϕ
F∗
d . Therefore, we
can show that (ϕH∗d )
−kH ≤ A−k
H
(ϕF∗d )
−kH (i.e., z ≤ A−k
H
y). As a result, we can lead to Ak
H
z ≤ y.
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asymmetry of ∆i in this subsection can be applied to the asymmetry of death probability
and entry cost.
We suppose that ∆H < ∆F and kH = kF . From (11) and (12), we can show that
zF > zH , zF 45 > zH45 , (19)
where we notice that yF > yH or yF < yH . Based on (19), when the round point H
bH is the
upper right of the square point of F bH (that is, zHbH > zF bH ), there exists equilibrium with
two-way trade (see Figure 3(a)). Using (17), we can derive the condition that zHbH > zF bH :
∆H
∆F
> 2
(
Akf
fx
+
fx
Akf
)−1
. (20)
Our findings can then be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the assumption (20) is satisfied. There then exists equilibrium
with two-way trade, where ϕF∗x > ϕ
H∗
x > ϕ
H∗
d > ϕ
F∗
d .
Proof. Making use of Figure 3(a), we find that the intersection S must lie above the y = z
line and hence, it holds that ϕH∗d > ϕ
F∗
d . From (3) and Lemma 2, we can confirm that
ϕF∗x > ϕ
H∗
x > ϕ
H∗
d > ϕ
F∗
d .
We provide the intuition behind Proposition 1. Recall that we are assuming ϕˆH > ϕˆF
so that ∆H < ∆F . Since the lower bound of the support of the productivity distribution
is higher in Home, operating home firms tend to have large productivities. Therefore, it is
more difficult for new potential-operating firms to enter the home market and hence, home
firms are less likely to be forced to exit. This corresponds to the order ϕH∗d > ϕ
F∗
d so that
ϕF∗x > ϕ
H∗
x from (3). From these inequalities, it can be found that ϕ
F∗
x > ϕ
H∗
d > ϕ
F∗
d ,
implying that foreign firms have difficulty with entry in the home market. Considering that
two-way trade arises at the equilibrium, we must keep Lemma 5, leading to ϕH∗x > ϕ
H∗
d . As
a result, we lead to Proposition 1. Moreover, from (20), we find that when ∆H is near to ∆F
such that the economy is symmetric, we can show the results in Proposition 1. The reason is
that to satisfy (20), ∆
H
∆F
must be large but we must maintain the assumption that ∆H < ∆F .
Having analyzed the case of ∆H < ∆F , we now briefly study the opposite case of ∆H >
∆F displayed in Figure 3(b). In this case, we can easily see that
yH > yF , zH45 > zF 45 . (21)
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In that case, as seen in Figure 3(b), it must hold that zF bF > zHbF under the two-way trade,
which corresponds to the following inequality:
1
2
(
Akf
fx
+
fx
Akf
)
>
∆H
∆F
. (22)
The intersection S then uniquely exists in the lower right of the 45-degree line and in the
upper left of the bF = 1 line as in Figure 3(b). We summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the assumption (22) is satisfied. There then exists the equilib-
rium with two-way trade, where the productivity cutoff levels are ordered by: ϕH∗x > ϕ
F∗
x >
ϕF∗d > ϕ
H∗
d .
Proof. See Proposition 1.
4.2 Asymmetric shape parameters
We now assume that the shape parameters are asymmetric: kH ̸= kF where we assume that
ϕˆ ≡ ϕˆH = ϕˆF . It can be observed that ∆i includes the shape parameter ki. Therefore,
kH ̸= kF leads to ∆H ̸= ∆F .14 The asymmetry of the shape parameters ki makes analytical
inquiry difficult due to the highly nonlinear system of FECs. Therefore, we narrow down the
possible cases under the asymmetric shape parameters. Concretely, we can rewrite FEC-H
in (9) as z = ∆
H
−fxA−k
H
y
f . Substituting it into FEC-F in (9) yields:
Ψ(y) ≡ fy
kF
kH + fxA
−kF
(
∆H − fxA
−kHy
f
) kF
kH
−∆F = 0. (23)
We can then show Ψ′(y) = 0 as follows:
Ψ′(y) = 0, ⇒ y =
(
Ak
F
f
fx
) kH
kH−kF
(
Ak
H
f
fx
) kH
kH−kF
z. (24)
We call (24) as Ψ′(y) = 0 line. We then find the following:
Lemma 6 Assume that kF > kH . Then, the Ψ′(y) = 0 line is in the lower of the bF = 1
line. Next, assume that kF < kH . Then, the Ψ′(y) = 0 line is in the upper of the bH = 1
line.
14We must observe that ki > kj may lead to ∆i > ∆j or ∆i < ∆j , which depends on the value of ϕˆ. For
instance, when 1 > ϕˆ > 0, we can always see that ∂∆
i
∂ki
> 0. However, if ϕˆ > 1, it may be held that ∂∆
i
∂ki
< 0.
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Proof. Assume that kF > kH . It then holds that
( fx
Ak
F
f
) kH
kF >
(AkF f
fx
) kH
kH−kF
(AkH f
fx
) kH
kH−kF ,
meaning that the slope of the bF = 1 line in (15) is large relative to that of the Ψ′(y) = 0
line in (24). That is, the Ψ′(y) = 0 line is in the lower of the bF = 1 line. Next, assuming
that kF < kH , we find that
(AkF f
fx
) kH
kH−kF
(AkH f
fx
) kH
kH−kF > A
kH f
fx
, meaning that the slope of
the Ψ′(y) = 0 line in (24) is larger than that of the bH = 1 line. Hence, the Ψ′(y) = 0 line is
in the upper of the bH = 1 line. See Figures 4(a) and 4(b).
From Lemma 6, we lead to the following three findings. First, there are no multiple
equilibria with two-way trade. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show the cases in which there are two
intersections S1 and S2. Figure 4(a) assumes that k
H < kF , yH > yF , and zH > zF , while
Figure 4(b) assumes that kH > kF , yH < yF , and zH < zF . In both cases, we can see that
the square point F bF lies in the upper right of the round point HbF and that the round
point HbH is in the upper right of the square point F bH . Then, Lemma 6 implies that the
intersection S2 must be in the lower of the b
F = 1 line in Figure 4(a) and that it must be in
the upper of the bH = 1 line in Figure 4(b). Therefore, the intersections S2 in both figures lie
in the outside of the area where bH > 1 and bF > 1, so that two-way trade cannot be seen at
the intersection S2. Therefore, the number of the equilibrium with two-way trade is at most
one.
Second, when the intersection between FEC-H and FEC-F arises in the area where bH > 1
and bF > 1, which excludes the intersections S2 in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), we find that the
negative slope of the FEC-H line is always greater than that of the FEC-F graph from Lemma
6 (See S1 in Figures 4(a) and 4(b)). That is,
∂y
∂z
∣∣
FEC-H
< ∂y∂z
∣∣
FEC-F
(< 0) in (10). This finding
is plausible because at the intersection between FEC-F and the Ψ′(y) = 0 line (see the square
point K in Figures 4(a) and 4(b)), the slope of the tangial line of FEC-F is the same as that
of FEC-H.15 This is important in analyzing the welfare impacts of trade liberalization in the
next section.
Finally, suppose that yF > yH and zH > zF as in Figures 5(a) and 5(b). In that case, we
can always see that the intersection is in the outside of the area in which bH > 1 and bF > 1
15This finding can be directly confirmed using (10). Assume that kH > kF . Then, if ∂y
∂z
∣∣
FEC-H
> ∂y
∂z
∣∣
FEC-F
in (10), we can see that
(
Ak
H
f
fx
<
)(
Ak
F
f
fx
) kH
kH−kF
(
Ak
H
f
fx
) kH
kH−kF z < y. This inequality indicates the area in
which bH < 1 and bF > 1. In a similar manner, assuming that kF < kH , ∂y
∂z
∣∣
FEC-H
> ∂y
∂z
∣∣
FEC-F
in (10), we
show the area in which bH > 1 and bF < 1.
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because of Lemma 6.
We can then summarize these findings:
Proposition 3 Assume that kH ̸= kF . First, there are no multiple equilibria with two-
way trade. Second, at the equilibrium with two-way trade, it always holds that dydz
∣∣
FEC-H
<
dy
dz
∣∣
FEC-F
(< 0). Finally, there is no equilibrium with two-way trade under yF > yH and
zH > zF .
Based on Proposition 3, the cases that we should consider are as follows: (i) yH > yF
and zH < zF ; (ii) yH > yF and zH > zF ; (iii) yH < yF and zH < zF .
Case (i): yH > yF and zH < zF : Assuming that yH > yF and zH < zF , from (11) we can
find the following inequality:
fx
AkHf
f
kF−kH
kF <
∆H
(∆F )k
H/kF
<
Ak
H
f
fx
f
kF−kH
kF
x . (25)
Let us focus on the shape parameters. When the value of A
kH f
fx
is sufficiently large, the
inequality (25) tends to be met. Since A > 1, a larger kH may lead to the inequality (25).
Because the lower bounds of the productivity distribution are the same in both countries
(i.e., ϕˆH = ϕˆF ), a larger shape parameter in the home country means that home firms do
not have the opportunity for large productivities due to less productivity dispersion. On the
contrary, examining f (k
F
−kH)/kH and f
(kF−kH)/kH
x in (25), the inequality tends to be satisfied
under kF > kH because the trade is costly under fx > f . It can be concluded that the shape
parameter kH has a large value, and furthermore the parameter kF has a larger value. As
a result, there exists an asymmetry of productivity dispersion; however, in this case, less
dispersion leads to equilibrium with two-way trade. It should be noticed again that a larger
shape parameter corresponds to less dispersion of productivity distribution.
The fact that both FEC-H and FEC-F have a negative slope means that the number of the
intersection between FEC-F and FEC-H is always one, which is the same as the equilibrium
in Figures 3(a) and 3(b), except that FEC-F is given by a straight line in Section 4.1 and is
a curve graph in this case. Taking account of (12) and (17), we find the following:
Proposition 4 Assume that yH > yF and zH < zF . (i) The equilibrium with two-way
trade shows that ϕF∗x > ϕ
H∗
x > ϕ
H∗
d > ϕ
F∗
d if zF 45 > zH45 and zHbH > zF bH , that is,
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f+f−k
H
x(
f+fxA−k
F
)kH/kF >
∆H
(∆F )k
H/kF
> 2f
kF−kH
kF Υ. (ii) The equilibrium with two-way trade shows
that ϕH∗x > ϕ
F∗
x > ϕ
F∗
d > ϕ
H∗
d if zF 45 < zH45 and zHbF < zF bF , that is,
f+f−k
H
x(
f+fxA−k
F
)kH/kF <
∆H
(∆F )k
H/kF
< 2−k
H/kF f
kF−kH
kF
x Λ.
Proof. The proof is fundamentally the same as that in Proposition 1. From (12) and (17),
we can obtain the results.
Case (ii): yH > yF and zH > zF : When yH > yF and zH > zF , (11) leads to the
following:
∆H
(∆F )kH/kF
>
Ak
H
f
fx
f
kF−kH
kF
x
(
>
fx
AkHf
f
kF−kH
kF
)
. (26)
At first, when kH > kF in case (ii), there is no intersection because FEC-F is convex to
the origin. Therefore, assume that kH < kF as in Figure 4(a). Unlike (25), when A
kH f
fx
has a
small value, the inequality (26) tends to be met. That is, noting that A > 1, a small value of
kH may lead to (26), implying that home country has greater productivity dispersion. The
symmetry of the productivity lower bound ϕˆ ≡ ϕˆH = ϕˆF implies that home firms have a
better chance of obtaining greater productivity. In case (ii), if the intersection between FEC-
H and FEC-F exists, the number of the intersection is always two. However, as confirmed
in Proposition 3, two-way trade does not arise at the intersection S2 of Figure 4(a). On the
contrary, at the intersection S1, it is possible that two-way trade arises. More concretely, if
zF 45 > zH45 and zHbH > zF bH as in Proposition 4(i), there exists the equilibrium with two-way
trade, which has ϕF∗x > ϕ
H∗
x > ϕ
H∗
d > ϕ
F∗
d . Supposing that zF 45 < zH45 and zHbF < zF bF as
in Proposition 4(ii), we find the two-way trade equilibrium with ϕH∗x > ϕ
F∗
x > ϕ
F∗
d > ϕ
H∗
d .
These conditions are the same as
Case (iii): yH < yF and zH < zF : The inequalities of yH < yF and zH < zF can be
rewritten as:
∆H
(∆F )k
H/kF
<
fx
AkHf
f
kF−kH
kF
(
<
Ak
H
f
fx
f
kF−kH
kF
x
)
. (27)
Since the condition that kH < kF leads to no intersection between FEC-F and FEC-H
in (z, y) graph, we suppose that kH > kF as in Figure 4(b). This is the opposite to case (ii)
under kF > kH . In sum, it is likely to satisfy the inequality (27) when kH has a small value,
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and furthermore, kH > kF means that kF takes a smaller value. Then, at the intersection
S1 in Figure 4(b), two-way trade may occur. Concretely, the inequalities zHbH > zF bH
and zF 45 > zH45 lead to the two-way trade equilibrium that ϕ
F∗
x > ϕ
H∗
x > ϕ
H∗
d > ϕ
F∗
d .
When zF 45 < zH45 and zHbF < zF bF , we find equilibrium with the two-way trade where
ϕH∗x > ϕ
F∗
x > ϕ
F∗
d > ϕ
H∗
d .
5 Welfare and trade liberalization
In the last section, we determined the productivity cutoff levels that satisfy FECs under
two-way trade ϕi∗d and ϕ
i∗
x (i = H, F ). We now confirm the determination of the remaining
variables. First, we can determine the weighted average productivities, ϕ˜id(ϕ
i∗
d ) and ϕ˜
i
x(ϕ
i∗
x ),
the probability of successful entry Di and Xi, and the following price index:
P i =
(∫
∞
ϕi∗
∫ M i
0
pi(z, ϕ)1−σdz
gi(ϕ)
1−Gi(ϕi∗)
dϕ+
∫
∞
ϕj∗x
∫ Mjx
0
pix(z, ϕ)
1−σdz
gj(ϕ)
1−Gj(ϕj∗x )
dϕ
) 1
1−σ
=
(
σ
σ − 1
)(
βL
σf
) 1
1−σ 1
ϕi∗
, (28)
Next, from (13) and (14b), we can determine the fraction of γH and γF , and their values
satisfy γi ∈ (0,min{2β, 1}) . Since two-way trade arises, we finally determine the mass of
domestic and export firms as follows: M id =
γHL
r¯i
and M ix =
Xi
Di
M id, where r¯
i = rid(ϕ˜
i
d(ϕ
i∗
d )) +
Xi
Di
rix(ϕ˜
i
x(ϕ
i∗
x )).
5.1 Bilateral trade liberalization
In this subsection, we examine the welfare impacts of trade liberalization. The welfare given
in (1) can be rewritten as:16
W i = (1− β)1−βββ
(
βL
σf
) β
σ−1
(ρϕi∗d )
β , i = H,F. (29)
Since the welfare level of the representative agent in a country i increases with ϕi∗d , it suffices
to analyze the effects of trade liberalization (i.e., a decrease in τ) on the productivity cutoff
16 We briefly show how to derive (29). First, maximizing the utility function (1) subject to a budget
constraint P iCi+N i = L (recall w = 1), we have P iCi = βL and N i = (1−β)L. Substituting these solutions
back into (1), we obtain U i = ββ(1− β)1−β(P i)−β . Inserting (28) into U i derived above, we obtain (29).
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level in the domestic market ϕi∗d . For this purpose, totally differentiating FEC-H in (9), we
can show that
z = z(y,A),where
∂z
∂y
= −
fx
fAkH
(< 0),
∂z
∂A
=
kHfxy
fAkH+1
(> 0). (30a)
In what follows, substituting (30a) into FEC-F in (9) and totally differentiating it leads
to the following:17
y = y(A), where
∂y
∂A
= B ×
y
z −
Ak
H
f
fx
dy
dz
∣∣
FEC-H
− dydz
∣∣
FEC-F
(> 0), (30b)
and B ≡ k
HfxA−k
F
−1z
f
(
z
y
) kF
kH
−1
> 0. We must observe that y < A
kH f
fx
z from (15). Further-
more, at the equilibrium with two-way trade, it holds that dydz
∣∣
FEC-H
< dydz
∣∣
FEC-F
(< 0) in the
denominator (See intersections S in Figures 3(a) and 3(b), intersection S1 in Figure 4(a), and
intersection S1 in Figure 5(b)). As a result,
∂y
∂A has a positive sign.
Finally, when substituting (30b) into (30a) again, we obtain the following:
z = z(A), where
∂z
∂A
= Θ×
fx
fAkF
−
(y
z
) kF
kH
dy
dz
∣∣
FEC-H
− dydz
∣∣
FEC-F
(> 0), (30c)
and Θ ≡ k
HfxA−1z
f
(
z
y
) kF
kH
−1
> 0. It should be observed that fx
fAk
F <
(y
z
) kF
kH from (15) and
that dydz
∣∣
FEC-H
< dydz
∣∣
FEC-F
(< 0). Therefore, it holds that ∂z∂A has a positive sign.
We can then show the welfare effects of trade liberalization:
Proposition 5 In the equilibrium with two-way trade, the effects of bilateral trade liberaliza-
tion on welfare are always positive.
Proof. The welfare effects can be calculated as follows:
∂WH
∂τ
=
∂WH
∂ϕH∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂ϕH∗
∂z︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂z
∂A︸︷︷︸
(+)
∂A
∂τ︸︷︷︸
(+)
< 0,
∂WF
∂τ
=
∂WF
∂ϕF∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂ϕF∗
∂y︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂y
∂A︸︷︷︸
(+)
∂A
∂τ︸︷︷︸
(+)
< 0, (31)
17After we substitute (30a) into FEC-F and differentiate it totally, we can show that:
(
kF
kH
fxA
−kF z
kF
kH
−1 ∂z
∂A
− kF fxA
−kF−1z
kF
kH
)
dA = −
(
fkF
kH
y
kF
kH
−1
+
kF fxA
−kF
kH
z
kF
kH
−1 ∂z
∂y
)
dy
When this equation is arranged, we can derive for (30b).
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Therefore, a decrease in τ increases the welfare.
Our finding in Proposition 5 is obtained by Lemma 2 and dydz
∣∣
FEC-H
< dydz
∣∣
FEC-F
(< 0).
When the productivity distribution is given by Pareto type, even if the numeraire sector
is additionally introduced and the asymmetry of the productivity distribution functions is
assumed, our finding is consistent with that in the one-sector Melitz model as long as two-
way trade can be seen. In other words, the bilateral trade liberalization under two-way trade
leads to welfare gain through better resource allocation. On the contrary, our finding differs
from Proposition 1 in Demidova (2008) that bilateral trade liberalization may lead to welfare
loss in a country.
5.2 Unilateral trade liberalization
We now assume that the trade liberalization arises in a country i alone; that is, a unilateral
trade liberalization under two-way trade. For simplicity, we consider a change in τH given
τF . Then, (30b) and (30c) can be rewritten as:
∂z
∂AH
=
−kH(AH)−1y
dy
dz
∣∣
FEC-H
− dydz
∣∣
FEC-F
(> 0),
∂y
∂AH
=
kH(AH)−1y(AF )−k
F fx
f
(
z
y
) kF
kH
−1
dy
dz
∣∣
FEC-H
− dydz
∣∣
FEC-F
(< 0), (32)
where we note that dydz
∣∣
FEC-H
< dydz
∣∣
FEC-F
(< 0). Then, we have the following proposition, the
intuitive explanation for which is given in the next section.
Proposition 6 Under the equilibrium with two-way trade, the unilateral trade liberalization
by a decrease in τH improves welfare in the home country, but deteriorates welfare in the
foreign country (that is, ∂W
H
∂τH
< 0 and ∂W
F
∂τH
> 0).
Proof. Making use of (31), we can show the welfare effect of unilateral trade liberalization
as follows:
∂WH
∂τH
=
∂WH
∂ϕH∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂ϕH∗
∂z︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂z
∂AH︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂AH
∂τH︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
(< 0),
∂WF
∂τH
=
∂WF
∂ϕF∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂ϕF∗
∂y︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂y
∂z
∂z
∂AH︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂AH
∂τH︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
(> 0). (33)
Therefore, we obtain the result in this proposition.
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6 Specialization in the differentiated good sector
So far, we have considered the situation where two-way trade in the equilibrium appears;
that is, it holds that 0 < γi < min{1, 2β} (i = H,F ). In this section, we now consider that
the equilibrium trade in a sector is specialized, and then examine the welfare effects of trade
liberalization in the differentiated good sector. We now denote the fraction of labor employed
in the homogenous good sector by Γi. Therefore, we can see that γi+Γi = 1 (i = H,F ). We
can then easily obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 7 Assume that γi = min{1, 2β}. (i) Assume that β < 0.5 so that γi = 2β(< 1). It
then holds that γj = 0, Γi = 1−2β, and Γj = 1. (ii) Assume that 1 > β > 0.5 so that γi = 1.
It then holds that γj = 2β − 1, Γi = 0 and Γj = 2(1− β).
Lemma 7 shows that whether or not a sector is specialized is determined by the value of
β in the consumer preference (1). Concretely, assuming that 0.5 < β < 1 and γi = 1(< 2β)
as in Lemma 7(ii), we can see the trade specialization in the homogeneous good sector;
however, we cannot investigate the specialization in the homogeneous good sector in our model
because of the model assumption that the homogeneous good is freely traded under imperfect
specialization. On the contrary, assuming that β < 0.5 and γi = 2β(< 1) as in Lemma 7(i),
the trade specialization arises in the differentiated good sector. In summary, there are no firms
that produce differentiated goods in a country j (i.e., M jd =M
j
x = 0); on the contrary, firms
in a country i produce their goods. In that case, the price indexes in each country are P j =(∫
∞
ϕi∗x
∫M ix
0 px(ϕ)
1−σ g
i(ϕ)
1−Gi(ϕi∗d )
dϕ
)1/(1−σ)
and P i =
(∫
∞
ϕi∗d
∫M id
0 pd(ϕ)
1−σ g
i(ϕ)
1−Gi(ϕi∗d )
dϕ
)1/(1−σ)
,
which can be rewritten as:
P i = Z(M id)
1/(1−σ)(ϕF∗d )
−1, P j = Zτ(M ix)
1
1−σ (ϕi∗d )
ki/(1−σ)(ϕi∗x )
(σ−1−kF )/(1−σ), (34)
where Z ≡
(
σ
σ−1
)(
ki
ki+1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
. We then obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Assume that γi = 2β and γj = 0. We then obtain ϕi∗d = ϕ
i∗
x =
(
f+fx
∆i
)1/ki
.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Let us consider why Proposition 7 shows ϕi∗d = ϕ
i∗
x under the costly trade. For simplicity,
suppose that γF = 2β and γH = 0. Unlike two-way trade, we cannot use FEC in (8) in the
home country because home firms do not enter the differentiated good sector, and furthermore
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we cannot use (3) under the specialization of the differentiated good sector. Now, since the
trade specialization in this sector arises, the world expenditure on differentiated goods equals
the total revenues in foreign country; that is, RF = EH + EF = 2β. Then, observing that
the expenditure on differentiated goods in each country is the same (EH = EF ) and fixed,
the entire exporting and non-exporting revenues are the same: DF rFd (ϕ˜
F
d ) = X
F rFx (ϕ˜
F
x ) as
confirmed in Appendix C. Hence, as in Proposition 7, the productivity cutoff levels are the
same.
Finally, let us consider the welfare impacts of trade liberalization (a decrease in the
iceberg cost) under the specialization. Unlike two-way trade, the iceberg cost does not have
any impacts on the productivity cutoff levels, as seen in Proposition 7. The reason is that
foreign firms can enter the home market, irrespective of home firms under the specialization
and therefore, the costly trade does not give any merits for the entry of domestic firms in the
home country. Since U i = ββ(1− β)1−β(P i)−β (i = H,F ) (See footnote 16 derived in (29)),
from (34) we easily find the following:
Proposition 8 Suppose that γF = 2β and γH = 0. In that case, it holds that ∂W
H
∂τ < 0 and
∂WF
∂τ = 0.
We now explain the intuition in Proposition 6 and 8. First, when the trade specialization
arises in the differentiated good sector, we cannot analyze the bilateral trade liberalization
but the unilateral trade liberalization. We then find that the unilateral trade liberalization
in Proposition 8 differs greatly from that in Proposition 6. Proposition 6 shows that the
unilateral trade liberalization deteriorates welfare in an importing country. The reason is
that less productive-exporting firms enter the market in the importing country, and hence
unilateral trade liberalization does not induce reallocations of resources to contribute an
aggregate productivity gain in the importing country.
When trade specialization in the differentiated good sector arises, as in Lemma 7, a
decrease in the iceberg cost does not lead to the further entry of less-productive-exporting
firms because home firms neither enter nor exit so that the demand on the differentiated goods
always balances the supply on those produced by foreign firms. No entry of foreign firms with
less productivities means that the reallocation of resources, which will be harmful to welfare
in the home country, cannot be seen. On the contrary, when the iceberg cost decreases,
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from (2a) we can see that the price of the differentiated goods produced by foreign firms
decreases, implying that consumers in the home country can spend on many differentiated
goods and hence, this increases home welfare. Because the trade liberalization does not
affect the productivity cut-off levels under the specialization, foreign welfare does not change
because the price of the domestic goods does not change.
7 Concluding Remarks
Incorporating the homogeneous good (numeraire) sector into the Melitz model, we re-consider
the findings in Demidova (2008), but, unlike her set-up, we assume the Pareto productivity
distribution function. Then, even if the asymmetry of the productivity distribution functions
is assumed, we conclude that the distortion caused by the numeraire sector is limited. Con-
cretely, we show that there are no multiple equilibria and no pure exporters and that the
welfare impacts of trade liberalization are qualitatively the same as those in the Melitz model
in one sector.
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Appendix A
Using (14a), we can derive (14b). Making use of M ix =
Xi
Di
M id and M
i
d =
γiL
r¯i
where M id and
M ix are the mass of domestic and export firms in a country i, (14a) can be rewritten as:
XHγH
DH r¯H
rHx (ϕ˜
H
x ) + (1− γ
H)− (1− β) =
XFγF
DF r¯F
rFx (ϕ˜
F
x ). (A.1)
In what follows, substituting r¯i = rid(ϕ˜
i
d) +
Xi
Di
rix(ϕ˜
i
x) and (13) into (A.1) and making use
of bH and bF , we can show that (A.1) is γ
H
bH+1
+ β − γH = 2β−γ
H
bF+1
, which leads to (14b).
Appendix B
Taking account of (13) and 0 < γi < 1, the fraction γi must be satisfied: 0 < γi <
min{1, 2β}. First, suppose that 0.5 > β so that 0 < γi < 2β. Substituting (14b) into this
one, we can show that
−1 <
bF − bH
bHbF − 1
< 1. (B.1)
We assume that bHbF > 1. From (B.1), we can show that −(bHbF − 1) < bF − bH <
bHbF −1. Therefore, to meet these inequalities, we conclude that bF > 1 and bH > 1. In what
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follows, assuming that bHbF < 1, from (B.1) we show that −(bHbF −1) > bF −bH > bHbF −1.
To meet these inequalities, it must be held that 0 < bH < 1 and 0 < bF < 1.
Next, suppose that 0.5 < β so that 0 < γi < 1. From (14b), the assumption 0.5 < β
means that b
F
−bH
bF bH−1
must be below the unity. We can then lead to the same inequality (B.1).
Therefore, we can conclude: bF > 1 and bH > 1 or 0 < bH < 1 and 0 < bF < 1.
Finally, we can exclude the case that 0 < bH < 1 and 0 < bF < 1, which satisfy 0 < γi <
min{1, 2β}. To be more concrete, we use bH = D
H
XH
rHd (ϕ˜
H
d )
rHx (ϕ˜
H
x )
. From (4), we can show that D
H
XH
=(
ϕH∗x
ϕH∗d
)kH
. In what follows, the ratio of revenue is given by
rHd (ϕ˜
H
d )
rHx (ϕ˜
H
x )
=
(
ϕF∗d
ϕH∗d
)σ−1 ( τϕ˜Hd
ϕ˜Hx
)σ−1
,
where ϕ˜Hd =
(
kH
1+kH−σ
)1/(σ−1)
ϕH∗d and ϕ˜
H
x =
(
kH
1+kH−σ
)1/(σ−1)
ϕH∗x . We can show that b
H =
τσ−1Ak
H+1−σ
(
ϕF∗d
ϕH∗d
)kH
. Similarly, we can lead to bF = τσ−1Ak
F+1−σ
(
ϕH∗d
ϕF∗d
)kF
. Therefore,
bH = 1 and bF = 1 lines are shown by (15). When depicting bH = 1 and bF = 1 in Figure 2,
we find that there is no area in which 0 < bH < 1 and 0 < bF < 1, while there is a (z, y)-area
that satisfies bH > 1 and bF > 1. Therefore, we can obtain Lemma 2.
Appendix C
Without loss of generality, we suppose that γH = 0 and γF = 2β. Substituting γH = 0 into
(14b), we show that (bH+1)(bF−1) = 0 so that bF = 1 because bH and bF have positive signs.
Noting that bF =
DF rFd (ϕ˜
F
d (ϕ
F∗
d ))
XF rFx (ϕ˜
F
x (ϕ
F∗
x ))
= 1, we find that D
F
XF
(
pFx (ϕ˜
F
x (ϕ
F∗
x ))
pFd (ϕ˜
F
d (ϕ
F∗
d ))
)σ−1
=
(
PH
PF
)σ−1
where
from (34) we can show that P
H
PF
= τ
(
XF
DF
)1/(1−σ) (
ϕF∗x
ϕF∗d
)σ−1−kF
1−σ
and p
F
x (ϕ˜
F
x (ϕ
F∗
x ))
pFd (ϕ˜
F
d (ϕ
F∗
d ))
=
τϕF∗d
ϕF∗x
. We
can show that this equation leads to (ϕF∗d )
kF = (ϕF∗x )
kF and hence, ϕF∗d = ϕ
F∗
x . Finally,
substituting ϕF∗d = ϕ
F∗
x into
(
f(ϕF∗d )
−kF + fx(ϕ
F∗
x )
−kF
)
= ∆F in FEC, we can obtain ϕF∗d =
ϕF∗x =
(
f+fx
∆F
)1/kF
.
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Figure 1: FEC-H and FEC-F: note that we omit FEC-F chain curves that kH < kF and
kH > kF .
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Figure 2: Trade balance conditions: note that we omit FEC-F chain curves that kH < kF
and kH > kF .
Figure 3: The cases of the unique equilibrium
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Figure 4: The cases of the multiple equilibria
Figure 5: The cases of no equilibrium with two-way trade
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